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SPECULATIONS ON THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO THE NEEDS OF BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICA
by Henry J. Richardson III
The liberation of some thirty million black people subjugated by
White Southern Africa {WSA) remains the overriding priority, and the
entire region, save for some sections of South Africa, is in dire need
of development for the welfare of Its peoples. Hany of the apparent
solutions to these imperatives lie either in the realm of currently
unavailable military force and strategy or are contingent upon outs ide
technical and economic resources allocated by rich but stingy governments on political grounds. In this context, it may be questioned
whether an international lega l system bereft of organized coercion to
enforce Its writ, and notoriously porous concerning questions of force
and violence, has any role at all to play In ameliorating the needs of
Black Southern Africa (BSA).
The question is indeed a valid one , but not because of the Inability
of the International community to make its law heard against the military thunder of both great and medium-sized states. Al l domestic legal
systems, almost by definition, become Inadequate when {9roe ~eure
overwhelms the institutions of state authority. Nor in times of peace
does law enforcement depend upon strict deterrence for general public
obedience to the spirit of the law. Rather it depends on a respect
held by the majority of the populace for those known principles constituting the law, which is in turn buttressed by a l oose consensus on the
primary moral attitudes under pinning that particular society. This
general internalized respect for law based on moral consensus manages
in times free from unusual stress to cover the society's activities
like a frayed three-quarter length blanket, leaving enough uncovered
in the way of violators to keep police, prosecutors, judges and prison
wardens busy, but usually not overwhelmed. The same is more or less
accurate for the international community. There ts behavior that rolls
along regulated by principles of international law which are obeyed
almost as a matter of course, such as the law of diplomatic privileges
and Immunities, the law of the high seas, the conventions and regulations
governing international aviation, and even much of the law of treaties.
But uncovered by the blanket is proportionately somewhat more behavior
than in a long-standing, reasonably stable domestic legal system, including that which might be regulated by the law relating to the justified use of force by states under the U.N. Charter, the definitions of
self-defense and aggression, the law relating to the sovereignty of a
state over its own domestic resources, and the law concerning state
responsibility towards aliens and their property. So the question for
international law in Southern Africa concerns not its existence, but
its adequacy to meet those present and future problems in that region
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that could possibly be met or ameliorated by a generally agreed body
of principles, processes, and implementing arrangements.
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The conception of international law here borrows heavily from both
Professors Myres McDougal and Richard Falk: the process of authoritative
decision which in its outcomes results in a system of principles and
implementing arrangements founded on expectations in the international
community as to what is legally permissible and what is not. These
expectations, of course, are subject to multiple political, economic,
social and cultural factors, not the least of which are racial attitudes.
The latter seems clear enough, in relation to black people in both
Southern Africa and the United States, to advance the proposition that
there is an analogy between international law in the Southern African
context and civil rights law in the United States. Such an analogy
promises to be useful in illuminating the challenges confronting international law relative to Black Southern Africa. This analogy is relevant because the similarities of context which it implies are increasingly
recognized and felt by many black people in both areas. Explicit consciousness of similarities in their condition has existed between the
intelligentsia of black America and West Africa since the late 19th
century, and this has grown into a recognition of at least symbolic
unity due in large part to the Garveyite Movement, the ancestral slavery
origins, and the recognition of the common racial bond in Black American
and somewhat less in West African literature. Similar contacts with
Southern Africa were more rare, although the young preacher, John
Chilembwe, sponsored by the African Methodist Episcopal Church, returned
home to Hyasaland from the United States to lead and be killed in the
first nationalist uprising in that territory in 1910, an event now a
solid part of Malawi nationalist tradition. More recently, black American consciousness of racism in South Africa has been stirred by the
presence of South African refugee students attending American universities on U.S. Government fellowships, the anti-apartheid campaign in
the United Nations, and South African brutality such as in Sharpeville
and the Terrorist Trials. Also representatives of the African Nationalist Congress and other Southern African liberation movements have
appealed to the black community as well as to white liberal groups for aid.
To understand the relevance of these interactions to international
law, another significant similarity must be noted. rn Southern Africa,
the meaning of black-ruled states attaining legal independence and the
recognition of their sovereignty did not include freedom from the threat
of either domestic or trans-national white domination. rn most of Africa
north of the Rovuma River, the legal expiration of British rule generally
left the new states with sufficient resources to assure their unquestioned
political dominance over the white settler and civil servant groups, as
for example in Kenya and Tanzania. rn the economic sector, however, so
much of the investment capital, management and private economic policymaking still rests in European and American hands 1n most independent
African countries as to be disquieting in the extreme.
In Southern Africa, however, the magnitude of the "white problem•
takes a quantum jump. The emergence into independence of the Black
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-24Southern African states had no impact on the legal status and the
political and military realities of Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese-control led Mozambique and Angola, South Africa, and Southwest Africa. The
military forces in the white redoubt are far superior to any available
in Black Southern Africa, or for that matter, in all of Black Africa
combined. The policies pursued in all of these territories rest on the
twin assumptions of the inferiority of the African and the white psycholo!ical and economic need for him to remain in a subservient position - policies inherently antithetical to the assumptions at the heart
of African independence. Further, domestic white power within each
newly independent state was not as significantly diminished as was the
case to the North. At independence, each of these states had a deficit
of nationals sufficiently trained to take over governmental administra·tion. The new governments, therefore, had little choice but to retain
most of the British colonial civil servants in positions of influence
in order to be able to run the country, an arrangement facilitated by
post-independence British aid, secondment and development programs.
In addition, the capital sectors of each of these national economies
are dominated by foreign capital from Britain, Rhodesia, South Africa,
and the U.S .• This means that in each country there is a substantial
white expatriate group with heavy influence in governmental and economic affairs, but without legal responsibility or public accountability.
These groups have substantial personal contacts with each other across
state lines, and with the dominant whites in Southern Rhodesia and
South Africa. "Islands of civilization in a black sea" is the prevailing
attitude. This means that there is an effective white network of influence throughout Southern Africa often operating outjide of governmental channels, against the opposition of which any black-controlled
government has a difficult, if not impossible time of effectively 1mposing social or economic policies, even though Africans form the vast
majority of the regional population.
In America, former black slaves have fought from one to another
subservient position relative to the white American ••Jority, under
conditions by now notorious. Black America is sequestered in the interstices of white society, with its numbers concentrated in mid-town urban
ghettos and southern farms and share-holdings. In 1970, white America
dominates politically and economically, and it now uses the repressive
instruments of state power increasingly openly against blacks and lately
a variety of other dissident groups who actively protest their condition
and defend their life styles.
If we look at the legal position of the black man in the law of
the United States in light of his relative position in the American
economy, and then look at the legal position of Black Southern Africa
and African states general ly in international law in light of their
relative position in the international economy, a parallel emerges .
For both groups there have been significant legal changes granting their
peoples and organizations additional protective political rights and
formal legal equality with their former legal masters. The law in both
contexts has moved through its legislative processes (admittedly imperfect,
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111-deffned, and yet to fully emerge in the international community)
to proclaim a fundamental change in socfal policy towards black people.
Yet in both contexts the monkey of white domination remains on the backs
of those supposedly liberated. And fn both instances, this domination
fs maintained primarily through heavy fnstftuttonal influence on or
control of economic instrumentalities, coupled with naked coercive
force still applied with some restraint.
Relative to Southern Africa (and to Black Africa as a whole) the
international legislative liberation began tn 1945 with the provisions
affirming the maintenance of human dignity tn the Atlantic Charter
which captured the hopes of colonized peoples around the world. These
provisions were subsequently affirmed as principles in Part II of the
U.N. Charter, the nearest equivalent to a general constitution tn the
international community. In 1948, the first resolution against South
African apartheid was introduced in the U.N. General Assembly by India,
the nearest though imperfect equivalent to an international legislature.
The same year saw the appearance of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights as a General Assembly resolution which, while not legally binding
on any state, has now become a statement of political rights so widely
recognized that no state dare openly disavow ft. The European Commission
on Human Rights founded fn 1950 provided hope that effective fnstftuttonal arrangements might evolve on a wide international scale to protect such rights, and indeed the efficacity of those particular arrangements has expanded to include quasi-judicial determination of violations
of such rights in Europe. Under the prodding of successively independent
African states, the U. N. General Assembly passed scores of resolutions
condemning apartheid, questioning the legitimacy of continuing South
Africa's mandate over Southwest Africa, and fn the process, spotlighting
the abstentions and negative votes of the United States, Britain and
France in conjunction with those of South Africa and Portugal.
This continuing hammering at the theme that discrimination within
a state on the basts of color should be a basis of international condemnation produced hearfngs on conditions fn South Africa by special
subcommittees of the U.N., and the proposal of an increasing number of
International multilateral treaties on human rights . Perhaps the most
significant of these is the International Convention to Eliminate all
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was proposed in 1965 and came
into force fn 1968. It fs significant that (1) this convention provides
for institutional machinery to receive tndfvtdual grievances and ultimately to publicize violations in states-party, and (2) that the U.S.
felt constrained to adhere to ft. The most important indication of a
shift in great power attitude was the determination by the U.N. Security
Council without a veto that white domination fn Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, and the consequent authorizing of economic sanctions.
In the same year (1966), the International Court of Justice fn handing
down the Southwest Africa decision, came excruciatingly close to deciding
that the cumulative legal effect of the foregoing international opposition to racial discrimination and apartheid had created a rule of custo-
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-26mary international law against such actfvfties in the domestic or international arenas. Its failure to do so has clearly damaged the prestige
of the Court. At the present tfme, the fight against apartheid and
for more effecti ve legal protection of human rights continues with the
General Assembly's revocation of the South African mandate over Southwest Africa and the activities of non-governmental groups such as the
International Commission of Jurists. The recently proposed International
Covenant on Social and Economic Rights and the International Covenant
on Polftfcal and Social Rights are additional relevant pieces of international legislation. The former see~s to be the ffrst major multilateral treaty explicitly recognizing the Intimate link between political
rights and economic opportunity and based on the tacit assumption that
both should be guaranteed within the framework of international law.
The point made by the foregoing incomplete recitation is that the
decentralized mechanisms whfch approximate a legislative process in the
international community have moved and said that racial discrimination
and especially apartheid are wrong and should be condemned under law
when perpetrated by any state government. Whether thfs principle yet
forms part of customary International law fs stfll fn dispute; an Increasing number of international legal scholars affirm that it does.
But it is clear that the proclaimed moral attitudes of the international
community condemn racial discrimination. The geographical cockpit of
thfs intense struggle has been Southern Africa as much as anywhere.
In the United States, the struggle of black people to free themselves from slavery and its remnants was untfl recently primarily conceived as a succession of legislative and judicial goals to be attained.
The Dred Soott decision of the Supreme Court holding essentially that
the black man had no rights as a person but only status as chattel, was
reversed by the post cfv11 war Cfv f1 Rights Acts of 1866 and the 13th,
14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution which respectively outlawed slavery, granted the black man citizenship, due process and equal
protection of the law, and gave him the ri9ht to vote. These amendments
also abrogated the provision in Article I l2) of the same Constitution
declaring that one Negro was three-fifths of a whfte man . But after
Reconstruction, there followed a long period of legislative and judicial evasion on the basfs of reinstituted white control of the South
whfch effectively nullified these ri ghts and returned the black man in
the South to peonage. The Black Codes of each southern and some northern
states and the Supreme Court's Ptleey decision of 1896 promulgating the
doctrine of "separate but equal" reflected this complete subjugation.
Meanwhile, his brethren migrating north discovered that thefr general
destiny was in the urban ghetto, legal rights notwithstanding.
After World War I, the NAACP, founded in 1909, began to lay the
judicial foundation for further protecting the black man's body from
lynching and hfs access to education, voting, due process of law, and
equal housing. After a long series of gradually favorable decisions
by the Supreme Court during the late 1930's and 1940's, the Court held
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In the milestone B~ decision In 1954 that segregated education was
Inherently unequal and must be abolished with all deliberate speed,
thus overturning the separate but equal doctrine of Pteesy. Brown
produced another period of attempts by the South to nullify this progress, all of which were successively and laboriously overturned by
the Supreme Court. Meanwhile In 1957, a first timid civil rights bill
was passed by Congress establishing the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
and giving very limited powers to the Justice Department to enforce
voting rights. This had been preceded In 1955 by Hartin luther King's
Montgomery Bus Boycott and a Supreme Court decision confirming its
legality. In 1960, the era of black mass demonstrations began with the
aim of wiping out racial discrimination In public places. Shortly
thereafter, a campaign was begun In the South to register black voters
under guerrilla warfare conditions by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee on the partial basts of a 1962 Supreme Court decision ordering
legislative reapportionment on the basis of population. In 1964, Congress passed the Public Accommodations Act outlawing racial discrimination In all public places participating in inter-state commerce. In
1965, the Voting Rights Bill was passed reaffirming the right of black
people to vote under the 15th Amendment and giving the Justice Department increased powers to enforce those rights. Thfs legislation was
augmented by various Supreme Court decisions and a Constitutional amendment forbidding states to impose a poll tax as a voting qualification.
In 1968, Congress passed legislation outlawing racial discrimination
In all federally financed housing, but only under the tragic prodding
of the assassination of Martin luther King.
In 1964, the Federal Government discovered poverty in the cities,
and was soon made uncomfortably aware that the majority of the urban
poor were black . The Poverty Act of 1964 created the Office of Economic
Opportunity which has publicly studied "the poor" to an excruciating
extent, but has not appreciably relieved black poverty. The revealed
enormity of the problem coupled with rising black consciousness and
VIet-generated social discontent squarely raised the question of the
budgetary and resource priorities of the United States' white majority.
That question remains unanswered today - ie., whether the effective and
authoritative decision makers in the political, social and economic
processes will devote sufficient resources to effectively eradicate
this complex of problems which Is impossible without eradicating racial
discrimination. Meanwhile, the country Is in crisis as now black Americans have realized that though their legislative goals have been won,
they are relatively, in terms of their personal welfare and opportunities
in an ever-rich economy, no better off than before, and in some cases
worse off. Their attempts to go to the heart of the matter by questioning
local and national priorities In allocating resources have brought little
substantive response, a backlash psychology among the white majority and
general refusal to effectively implement existing programs, and the
Increasing use of the coercive Instruments of the State to subdue them
and their allies.
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Thus , in both the American and international arenas, the legislative process or its equivalent has responded to protest by rectifying
inequality in the law by reasserting the validity of agreed human and
political rights. However, the net result has been that black people
in both contexts (and many other people also) are now flatly faced with
their own awareness that political ri ghts mean little without access to
and influence on those institutions controlling wealth and other values
needed to give such rights content - eg. to provide economic opportunity .
They face the further awareness that those holding effective power over
the necessary resources -white people in America, the rich Western
countries in the world - will generally transfer them only under their
own nationalistic and self-serving conditions. The primary need of all
Africa, especially of Southern Africa, is to develop for the benefit
of its peoples. This process requires large infusions of economic and
technical resources, most of which is controlled on an incremental basis
by rich countries or by international institutions dominated by the same.
Investment as a source of capital is similarly controlled by large corporations closely allied with rich governments, and their predominance
in the economies of many African countries has already been mentioned.
Some of these same corporations in America control much of the private
investment capital needed to develop Black America.
This was the stark situation presented by UNCTAD I and II in 1964
and lg68 where 75 devel oping nations documented conclusively the fact
that their development was impossible as a group in the context of
present world economic conditions, allocations, and institutional arrangements, and proposed modified marketing arrangements , institutions,
and aid principles and practices. The primary response of the United
States was to de liver an ominous warning about the undesirable consequences of trying to coerce it and the other rich nations by using
voting majorities in International institutions, coupled with little
substantive consideration of the problems presented.
A second analogy between the American and Southern African contexts
is r elevant here. In both situations full-scale open sustained violence
by black people against those who dominate or hinder their development
Is somewhat unlikely and would probably be counter-productive against
overwhelming white-controlled military forces. However, the possibility
exists, and a situation of sporadic guerrilla warfare has developed in
both contexts in response to white violence by both authoritative and
non-authoritative means. In America, the activities of the Panthers,
Black Nationalists, SNCC, etc. are at the same time vocalizing and
acting out the inner fee l ings of many black Americans who for many
reasons do not presently wish to take such action themselves, but who
may give other support. In Southern Africa, the activities of freedom
fighters against the coordinated military forces of South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia and Portugal are reflecting the deepest sentiments of the majority of black Southern Africans (vide the strength of the national ist
opposition wi thin Malawi and lesotho and the very enthusiastic reception
given to Kaunda when he preached revolution in Botswana In 1967), at the
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for their own preservation to resist overt actiyities against South
Africa and Portugal and choose to accept aid or trade f r om them. Although the situations i n both of these contexts may r ise and ebb over
the short run. the intensity of injustice to bl ack people and resentment of the same against continued prejudice on all levels is such that
some kind of violent social upheaval or continuing corrosive violence
are distinct possibiliti es.
In light of all the above, l awmakers and the holders of effective
power are faced wl th the very rea 1 ques t1 on of whether they will become
effectively responsive to the needs of these two groups of black citizens
of these respective communities. That is , whether after having affirmed
and granted certain needed political rights and protection for them 1n
domestic legislation and international treaties, procedures will now be
legislated or otherwise approved in l aw for conferring real economic
and other benefits so these rights tan be effectively Implemented and
enjoyed on a day-to-day basis. Or, al ternatively whether law and lawmakers In both eontexts will not effectively respond, thereby raising
the probability of (1) Increasing the level of unauthorized violence
and disruption of minimum order, (2) confirming the moral bankruptcy of
the community through the constant violation by its effective decisionmakers of Its own publ icly expressed governing assumpti ons and moral
postulates, and (3) accelerating a modification of those assumptions and
postulates towards some kind of fascism with apartheid objectives.
Thus, we have facing International law, as the decentralized system
of regul ation and normative guidance serving the International community,
a profound challenge to legislate (or quasi-legislate) and implement the
economic confirmation of those human rights already recognized as arong
Its highest principles . This must be done on a global scale, because
the substance-matter of the challenge - racial discrimination, economic
deprivation , the weakness of being poor - is world-wide. If we once
again focus on Southern Africa, several regional challenges can be identified to which a revised system of international law must effectively
relate. The imperatives of this region cannot be neatly categorized
into "legal", "political", "economic", "social", and "moral" problems;
they interlock Into all these nomenclatures and into each other across
a very broad spectrum of behavior. But certain tasks can be identified.
The first such task of International law is for its decision-makers
and institutions to continue the search for effective strategies to
dismember the system of apartheid in South and Southwest Africa, and
closely related, to dismember the colonialist and racist regimes of
Portugal-in-Africa and Rhodesia. Economic sanctions under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter have been partly effective, but have lacked staying
power. At the l east, a more effective reporting and policing system is
needed to patrol for sanction violators. Also the scope of sanctions
needs to be effectively extended into the area of International credit
financing , and into the area of exempting the object of the sanctions
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from world-wide economic policies nominally having little apparent connection with that state, e.g . exempting South Africa from all benefits
under the recent decision of the International Monetary Fund to support
the price of gold at $35 per ounce.
Pending the completion of the first task, the second task is to
confirm the general legality of the Southern African liberation movements (not necessarily of all liberation movements) as organizations
with overwhelming popular encouragement in the region battling for the
two principles i n the world community that have been clearly condemned ,
ie., apartheid and colonialism. Doubtless some standard of proof would
have to be established to fix the aims and strategies of these movements,
and also to show that change towards a public order of human dignity in
this region will arrive via no other route. The meeting of such a burden of proof would possibly encourage states to aid these movements
overtly instead of through the covert channels now employed (except by
Zambia and Tanzania) and for governments to openly deal with them on
some basis short of diplomatic recognition as a method of denying legitimacy to WSA.
A doctrina l solution to this problem has traditionally been sought
in the context of Articles 2 (4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter with their
prohibitions on the use of force in the international community except
for "self-defense" against "aggression". And as may be expected , nl.lch
awaits the appearance of widely accepted definitions of the two key
concepts above. Western governments have generally sought to expand
"aggression" to cover all guerrilla activities crossing or influencing
events across international boundaries, thus justifying an expanded concept of "self-defense" to include any and all measures necessary to
stamp out the guerrilla movement in both its country of origin and its
country of impact. This is one legacy of America in Vietnam. On the
other hand, a formulation produced by the OAU focusses on liberation
movements as "self-defense" against racism and colonialfsm which constitute "permanent aggression" and therefore jus tffy any amount of force
needed for their eradication. There are contradictions in both fornl.llations. However, it seems likely that this second task will have to be
accompl ished within the general framework of Articles 2 (4) and 51,
because these standards have now become so widely accepted that all states
feel compelled to justify each use of force as self-defense against a
putative aggressor.
Similar to the above is the third task of legitimizing under international law the internal resistance movement to apartheid in South
Africa (and Rhodesia and Portugal) without compelling other nations to
legally enter into a state of war against the South African government.
The call here is for increased jurisdiction of the international community over a domestic government's internal policies when there is a conflict with a universally acclaimed principle. Presently , international
juri sdiction obtains principally under a finding by the Security Council
of a threat to international peace and security. A revised concept of

[
.

-31-

I
internationalization might initially commence with obligatory twiceyearly widely publicized declarations by all states against apartheid
and specifically in favor of the liberation movements or African disengagement from South Africa, or their facing the sanction of an equally
publicized presumption in law that the state refusing to make such a
declaration thereby actively supports apartheid, with appropriate publicity. A concomitant of this internationalization would be the granting
of authority to the United Nations to openly solicit funds and other
support for those liberation movements in the name of the International
community. And exception from the requirement of such public declaration might be made for those states on the periphery of South Africa
In danger of swift economic or military reprisal.
A fourth task is also related to the waiting period before apartheid
and colonialism in the area are dismembered. To the extent that South
Africa remains white-controlled and therefore more or less hostile,
actively or potentially, to the surrounding black states, the doctrine
of national self-determination must be strengthened on the basis of
community expectations that these states will be actively supported
short of war, especially by economic means, against all attempts by
South Africa to exert pressures and controls over their destinies. The
Interactions between South Africa and these states, e.g. the terms of
the recently renegotiated customs union, must become legally relevant.
Not only must the doctrine of self-determination connote the right to
be left free from military interference, but also the right to receive
a proportionate share of certain needed resources to meet an identified
threat to that nation's exercise of its self-determination. A beginning
point might be the following rationale. It is accepted as one of the
"rules of the game" of international life that in a defined region the
most powerful state of that region can exercise certain kinds of influence over the smaller states without effective protest by the general
international community, so long as the dominating state does nothing
too outrageous. The outstanding examples, of course, are the United
States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and
these "rules of the game" have mostly evolved from an understanding
between the great powers not to overtly interfere into each other's
spheres of influence. For a regional state possessing substantial military and economic resources, the exertion of this kind of influence is
almost taken for granted when confined to economic strategies; in other
words, these states acquire a tacit right to act in this manner with low
visibility, and no doctrine of International law is considered violated
under those conditions. Southern Africa is rapidly evolving as such
a region with the Republic as the dominating power, and this evolution
seems destined to continue so long as the Cape is under white rule.
Consistent both with the doctrine of national self-determination and the
first task of developing more effective sanctions would be a legal principle obligating the international community to supply massive doses of
aid to the Black Southern African states specifically to enable them to
disengage to the extent possible from South Africa, on the grounds that
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(1) their self-determination is overtly threatened; and (2) South Africa
is an international outlaw - she has consistently violated a universally
agreed principle of moral and legal behavior - and as such no longer has
the. tacit right given to other dominating regional states to exercise
substantial non-military influence in that region. Again, several burdens of proof would have to be defined, but this is not an insuperable
difficulty. Another possibility would be to expand the legal consequences of economic coercion, especially by powerful against weak states,
so that treaties concluded under those circumstances become legally
voidable at the free discretion of the weak state, with economic aid
from international sources guaranteed to offset reprisals.
A final task for international law would be to evolve doctrines
designed to (1) increase the volume of aid needed for the development
of the Black Southern African states; and (2) related to the maintenance
of national self-determination , to evolve doctrines prescri bing that
the ultimate disposition of that aid for development rests with the
black state, and that the latter should be free from overwhelming bilateral and even multilateral pressures to modify development priorities
according to outside conceptions, and especi ally free from the threat
of the withdrawal of such aid. Relative to (1), an immediate priority
is to evolve a principle of obligatory aid in international law, ie.,
a tax on the rich countries for the benefit of development in the poor
countri es with equitable allocating arrangements. With respect to (2),
aid-mediating mechanisms on the international level are needed, similar
to the investment mediating mechanisms provided by the World Bank's Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, to provide accurate
fact-finding and to resolve disputes of final authority over the disposition of aid . This task is relevant to all developing countries, not
only the BSA states.
The relevance of international law to all of these needs depends
not only on available resources and external community attitudes, but
also on the timing of the invocation of international l egal principles
relative to the evolving political and economic situation in Southern
Africa. A doctrine of national self-determination must be claimed by
those nations who would benefit before its validity can be upheld by
international machinery; closer economic dependence on South Africa by
the Black Southern African states could work to forestall such claims .
Again, if local initiative is taken, the unity of black states and black
peoples in that region could result in new regional institutions capable
of drawing substantial international support for the porposes of development and/or disengagement, especially in view of the ascendance of the
regional concept in bilateral aid.
In the last analysis, Southern Africa as a region will be subjected
to some kind of transnational regulation of varying effectiveness, whether
a Pax South Africana or some other. If the revolution against colonialism and apartheid is successful, regulation will be needed to institu-
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tfonalfze its validity and bufld a new regional public order on the
basts of those principles fought and died for by black people, and to
allocate scarce resources for the greatest benefit. If the revolution
fs unsuccessful, at least fn the near future, then whatever regulation
system enveloping the region must be manipulated by all means possible
to secure the maximum benefit for black people . In either case, the
system of regulation has been and will be international law, by whatever name ft is called.
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